Loading…
The theoretical indispensability of concepts
Machery denies the traditional view that concepts are constituents of thoughts, and he more provocatively argues that concepts should be eliminated from our best psychological taxonomy. I argue that the constituency view has much to recommend it (and is presupposed by much of his own theory), and th...
Saved in:
Published in: | The Behavioral and brain sciences 2010-06, Vol.33 (2-3), p.228-229 |
---|---|
Main Author: | |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Summary: | Machery denies the traditional view that concepts are constituents of thoughts, and he more provocatively argues that concepts should be eliminated from our best psychological taxonomy. I argue that the constituency view has much to recommend it (and is presupposed by much of his own theory), and that the evidence gives us grounds for pluralism, rather than eliminativism, about concepts. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 0140-525X 1469-1825 |
DOI: | 10.1017/S0140525X10000506 |