U.S. Comprehensive Strategy Toward Russia

• Published in: Policy File 2015
• Main Authors: Carafano, James Jay, Bromund, Ted R, Cheng, Dean, Coffey, Luke, Curtis, Lisa, Dale, Helle C, Dodge, Michaela, Inserra, David, Klingner, Bruce, Kochis, Daniel, Olson, Ryan, Phillips, James, Quintana, Ana, Riley, Bryan, Slattery, Brian, Wilson, William T
• Format: Report
• Language: English
• Subjects: Foreign policy; Superpowers/International relations; The Heritage Foundation

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has not had a coherent, comprehensive strategy toward Russia. As the Russian invasion of Ukraine demonstrates, the U.S. has paid a price for this failure and, of course, many of Russia's neighbors have paid far higher prices. At the core of the U.S. failure has been an unwillingness to assess the nature of the Russian regime realistically and to base its policy on that assessment. Too often, the U.S. has relied on wishful thinking. Comprehensive strategy is commonly held to be a serious and ongoing effort to relate the means and ends of national policy and---within the limits of the U.S. system---to mobilize all national assets to achieve those ends. Yet it also requires something more fundamental: a sense of where you are. U.S. comprehensive strategy toward Russia must be part of an even larger strategy and cannot be an end in itself because---unlike during the Cold War---Russia is not the U.S.'s primary opponent, even though Russia has defined itself as a geopolitical adversary to the U.S. But precisely because part of Russia's strategy relies on returning to the Soviet approach of playing the spoiler, Russia is irresponsibly involved in many of the world's problems, hot spots, and crises. Within the overarching need for a U.S. comprehensive strategy, Russia poses four distinct, but related problems for U.S. policy.