"Nash-in-Nash" Tariff Bargaining with and without MFN

We provide an equilibrium analysis of the efficiency properties of bilateral tariff negotiations in a three-country, two-good general equilibrium model of international trade when transfers are not feasible. We consider "weak-rules" settings characterized by two cases: a no-rules case in w...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Policy File 2017
Main Authors: Bagwell, Kyle, Staiger, Robert W, Yurukoglu, Ali
Format: Report
Language:English
Subjects:
Bargaining
Conflicts
Economic policy
Efficiency
Equilibrium
International cooperation
International trade
Liberalization
Negotiation
Property
Tariffs
Welfare
Online Access:Request full text
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