Personhood and Neuroscience: Naturalizing or Nihilating?

Personhood is a foundational concept in ethics, yet defining criteria have been elusive. In this article we summarize attempts to define personhood in psychological and neurological terms and conclude that none manage to be both specific and non-arbitrary. We propose that this is because the concept...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:American journal of bioethics 2007-01, Vol.7 (1), p.37-48
Main Authors: Farah, Martha J., Heberlein, Andrea S.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Awareness
Bioethical Issues
Bioethics
Brain - anatomy & histology
Brain - physiology
Cognitive Science
Concept Formation
Consciousness
Ego
Ethical Theory
Human Characteristics
Humans
Intelligence
Memory
Metaphysics
Moral Obligations
Morals
Neurosciences
Pattern Recognition, Visual
Personhood
Social Perception
Thinking
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Summary:Personhood is a foundational concept in ethics, yet defining criteria have been elusive. In this article we summarize attempts to define personhood in psychological and neurological terms and conclude that none manage to be both specific and non-arbitrary. We propose that this is because the concept does not correspond to any real category of objects in the world. Rather, it is the product of an evolved brain system that develops innately and projects itself automatically and irrepressibly onto the world whenever triggered by stimulus features such as a human-like face, body, or contingent patterns of behavior. We review the evidence for the existence of an autonomous person network in the brain and discuss its implications for the field of ethics and for the implicit morality of everyday behavior.
ISSN:1526-5161
1536-0075
DOI:10.1080/15265160601064199