SU41. The Role of Cognitive Functioning in Agency Inferences in Schizophrenia and Healthy Controls

• Published in: Schizophrenia bulletin 2017-03, Vol.43 (suppl_1), p.S176-S176
• Main Authors: Prikken, Merel, van der Weiden, Anouk
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Abstracts
• ISSN: 0586-7614; 1745-1701
• DOI: 10.1093/schbul/sbx024.039

Background: Schizophrenia patients have impaired experiences of self-agency, ie, experiences of not being the actor of their own actions. The cognitive inference model defines 2 routes to explain these experiences. The explicit (ie, goal based) route is used in intentional behavior, while the implicit (ie, prime based) route is used in behavior that has no specific intention. Previous studies showed that the experience of self-agency depends on cognitive processes (eg, working memory or attention). Therefore, in the current study we examine how cognitive functioning, one of the core deficits in schizophrenia, is related to agency inferences and impairments herein. Methods: Thirty-six patients and 36 healthy controls were included. To measure explicit and implicit agency, an agency-inference task was administered. Participants performed an action (button press) and indicated whether they thought they were the agent of an outcome (the location of a rotating square), rated on a 9-point scale. They believed that their action resulted in a specific outcome, while in reality the outcome was preprogrammed. Actual outcomes either matched or mismatched a predetermined goal (explicit condition) or an implicitly primed outcome (implicit condition). Cognitive functioning was measured using the BACS. Results: Irrespective of condition and group, agency ratings were higher in matching compared with mismatching trials. In the explicit condition, the effect of matching on agency ratings did not differ between the groups. However, in the implicit condition, the effect of matching was significantly smaller in patients as compared with healthy controls ( F (1,70) = 5.66, P  = .02). Regression analyses showed that the BACS composite score was positively related to goal-based agency only. Conclusion: Our current findings are in line with those of previous studies in showing that patients and controls do not differ in their ability to make goal-based agency inferences but that patients are less efficient in using implicit cues to guide feelings of agency. Better cognitive functioning in both patients and healthy controls is related to increased goal-based agency inferences. Also, we showed that patients’ impairments in implicit agency inferences cannot not be explained by cognitive deficits.