The tangled webs we weave: Examining the effects of CEO deception on analyst recommendations

Research Summary Organizations are punished by analysts and investors when material deceit by their CEO is uncovered. However, few studies examine analysts' responses to deceptive CEOs before their deceit is publicly known. We use machine learning (ML) models to operationalize the likelihood of...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Strategic management journal 2024-01, Vol.45 (1), p.66-112
Main Authors: Hyde, Steven J., Bachura, Eric, Bundy, Jonathan, Gretz, Richard T., Sanders, Wm. Gerard
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agency theory
Analysts
Chief executive officers
Chief executives
Corporate governance
Deception
Diminishing returns
Earnings
Executives (Business)
Fraud
Governance
Investors
Machine learning
Misconduct
Scrutiny
Securities markets
Stock exchanges
Trust
upper echelons
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