Marginal Reputation

We study reputation formation where a long‐run player repeatedly observes private signals and takes actions. Short‐run players observe the long‐run player's past actions but not her past signals. The long‐run player can thus develop a reputation for playing a distribution over actions, but not...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Econometrica 2025-11, Vol.93 (6), p.2007-2042
Main Authors: Luo, Daniel, Wolitzky, Alexander
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Action
Bayesian analysis
Bayesian persuasion
confound‐defeating
cyclical monotonicity
Delegation
Deterrence
Mapping
optimal transport
Persuasion
repeated games
Reputation
Reputations
Signaling
Strategies
Citations: Items that this one cites
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