Managerial risk-reducing incentives and social and exchange capital

This study investigates the impact of managerial risk-reducing incentives on the firm's social and exchange capital. Using CEO inside debt holdings to proxy for the incentives of risk-averse managers, we find that CEOs with more inside debt holdings are likely to invest more in building social...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Zhuang Zhang, Amon Chizema, Jing-Ming Kuo, Qingjing Zhang
Format: Default Article
Published: 2021
Subjects:
Social capital
Managerial risk-reducing incentives
CEO inside debt holdings
Institutional investors
Exchange capital
Firm risk
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/2134/17045813.v1
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