Power and welfare in bargaining for coalition structure formation

We investigate a noncooperative bargaining game for partitioning n agents into non-overlapping coalitions. The game has n time periods during which the players are called according to an exogenous agenda to propose offers. With probability δ, the game ends during any time period t< n. If it does,...

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Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Syeda Fatima, Tomasz Michalak, Michael Wooldridge
Format:	Default Article
Published:	2015
Subjects:	Artificial intelligence not elsewhere classified Software engineering not elsewhere classified Other information and computing sciences not elsewhere classified Bargaining Coalition structure games Externalities Subgame perfect equilibrium Core Artificial Intelligence and Image Processing Information and Computing Sciences not elsewhere classified Computer Software
Online Access:	https://hdl.handle.net/2134/25420
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