Scoring rules and competitive behavior in best-value construction auctions

© 2016 American Society of Civil Engineers. This paper examines the extent to which engineers can influence the competitive behavior of bidders in best value or multiattribute construction auctions, in which both the (dollar) bid and technical nonprice criteria are scored according to a scoring rule...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Pablo Ballesteros-Perez, Martin Skitmore, Eugenio Pellicer, Xiaoling Zhang
Format: Default Article
Published: 2016
Subjects:
Other built environment and design not elsewhere classified
Construction auctions
Scoring rule
Capped auctions
Economic bid weighting
Abnormally low bids criterion
Bid scoring formula
Competitive bidding
Contracting
Built Environment and Design not elsewhere classified
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/2134/32752
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